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Obviousness and New Technologies 
 
John Kasdan* 
INTRODUCTION 
Let’s take a look at a claim from a patent issued last year. 
Claim 1 of US Patent No. 5794207 (the so-called “Priceline.com 
patent”) reads as follows: 
1. A method for using a computer to facilitate a transaction 
between a buyer and at least one of sellers [sic], compris-
ing: inputting into the computer a conditional purchase of-
fer which includes an offer price; inputting into the com-
puter a payment identifier specifying a credit card account, 
the payment identifier being associated with the conditional 
purchase offer; outputting the conditional purchase offer to 
the plurality of sellers after receiving the payment identi-
fier; inputting into the computer an acceptance from a 
seller, the acceptance being responsive to the conditional 
purchase offer; and providing a payment to the seller by us-
ing the payment identifier.1 
This has been referred to as a reverse Dutch auction, and in-
 
 * Lecturer in Law, Columbia University School of Law. The preparation of this pa-
per was supported by a writing grant from the Oracle Corporation. Additional funding 
was provided by the Julius Silver Program in Law, Science and Technology at the Co-
lumbia University School of Law. The author would like to thank Hal Edgar, Henry Le-
bowitz and David Boundy for useful conversations regarding this paper, Gerald Goldberg 
and several of his examiners for attempting to give me some understanding of the work-
ings of the Patent Office examination procedure and Frank Grad for encouragement, use-
ful citations and a place to work. Any errors, misunderstandings or solecisms are entirely 
the responsibility of the author. 
1. Patent #5794207, “Method and apparatus for a cryptographically assisted com-
mercial network system designed to facilitate buyer-driven conditional purchase offers,” 
issued Aug. 11, 1998. 
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deed it has some of the aspects of the Dutch auction in that a plu-
rality of sellers have the choice of accepting the offered price.2  
However it seems to lack the defining characteristic of the Dutch 
auction: that the price declines before the bidders, placing pressure 
on the high-value bidder as soon as the price drops below his res-
ervation value.3 But in any case, this procedure sounds not unlike 
what one does when one calls a travel agent and says, “get me a 
ticket to Peoria for next Tuesday on any airline, and charge it to 
my credit card, but don’t get it unless it’s under $400.” 
In other words, probably to most laymen, and even to a reason-
able number of intellectual property lawyers, this sounds like a 
patent which has been given to a procedure which has been around, 
if not necessarily in a computer context, for a long time. How have 
we gotten into a situation where such patents are issuing, what is 
likely to happen to them, should we worry about them and, if so, 
are there any actions we should take? 
I.  PATENTS ON METHODS OF DOING BUSINESS 
A recent decision, State Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature 
Financial Group4, has brought a new clarity to the patenting of 
“business methods.” 
The patent in question (assigned to Signature) is described as 
being: 
generally directed to a data processing system (the system) 
for implementing an investment structure which was devel-
oped for use in Signature’s business as an administrator and 
accounting agent for mutual funds. In essence, the system, 
identified by the proprietary name Hub and Spoke, facili-
tates a structure whereby mutual funds (Spokes) pool their 
assets in an investment portfolio (Hub) organized as a part-
nership. This investment configuration provides the admin-
 
2. McAfee and McMillan, Auctions and Buildings, 25 J. OF ECON. LIT. 699, 702 
(June 1987). 
3. Id. 
4. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied,  119 S. Ct. 704 (1999). 
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istrator of a mutual fund with the advantageous combina-
tion of economies of scale in administering investments 
coupled with the tax advantages of a partnership.5 
State Street attempted to license the patent and, when negotia-
tions broke down, sued in Massachusetts District Court for a de-
claratory judgment holding the patent invalid as not claiming statu-
tory subject matter under the patent laws. The District Court found, 
among other things, that the subject matter of the Signature patent 
indeed fits into a judicially created exemption which prohibited the 
patenting of “business methods.”6 
However, in his opinion overturning the decision of the District 
Court, the late Judge Giles S. Rich stated: “[t]he business method 
exception has never been invoked by this court, or the CCPA, to 
deem an invention unpatentable.”7 And he concluded his analysis 
by decreeing, “[w]hether the claims are directed to subject matter 
within § 101 should not turn on whether the claimed subject matter 
does ‘business’ instead of something else.” 8 
Thus, since certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court9 the 
Patent Office will of necessity find itself examining patents relat-
ing to methods of doing business.  While a certain number of such 
patents, for example number 4346442, “Securities brokerage-cash 
management system” issued in 1982, have been granted before, 
and have even been defended successfully in litigation,10 State 
Street changes, and substantially broadens, the field of discoveries 
which must hereafter be viewed as statutory subject matter under 
35 U.S.C. §101.11 
 
5. Id. at 1370. 
6. Id. at 1375. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 1377. 
9. 119 S. Ct. 851 (1999). 
10. See Paine, Webber, Jackson and Curtis v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and 
Smith, 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1982). 
11. “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufac-
ture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a 
patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101 
(1994). 
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For example, in Paine, Webber v. Merrill, Lynch, Judge 
Latchum carefully noted: 
if no [mathematical] algorithm exists, the product of a 
computer program is irrelevant, and the focus of analysis 
should be on the operation of the program on the computer. 
The Court finds that the 442 patent claims statutory subject 
matter because the claims allegedly teach a method of op-
eration on a computer to effectuate a business activity.12 
On the other hand, in State Street Judge Rich broadly pro-
claimed of the business method exception, “[w]e take this opportu-
nity to lay this ill-conceived exception to rest” and went on to say, 
“[s]ince the 1952 Patent Act, business methods have been, and 
should have been, subject to the same legal requirements for pat-
entability as applied to any other process or method.”13 
Since he refered to cases from as long ago as 190814 which far 
pre-date the computer, it is arguably the case that Rich was sug-
gesting that even business methods which are implemented without 
the use of a computer should be eligible for patent protection (al-
though it appears that, under current practice, the PTO would reject 
such applications).  However, he certainly did not suggest that the 
section 103 non-obviousness required for patentability must be 
found in the details of the computer program which implements the 
business method.15 
In fact, Judge Rich’s reliance on Diamond v. Diehr,16 suggests 
that the analysis of a patent for a business method should focus on 
the method itself.17 As Justice Rehnquist wrote in that case, “[t]he 
claimed invention is a process for molding raw, uncured synthetic 
rubber into cured precision products”18 and went on merely to state 
 
12. 564 F. Supp. 1358, 1369. 
13. 149 F.3d at 1375. 
14. Id. at 1376 (Rich, J. referring to Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 
160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908)). 
15. See id. 
16. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
17. See State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373. 
18. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177. 
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that the presence of a computer program in the implementation of 
the invention did not remove it from the category of patentable 
subject matter. This left the determination of non-obviousness to 
considering whether the “method of molding rubber” was non-
obvious, not whether the computer programming was.19 
Similarly, when Judge Rich, in State Street, addressed the 
lower court’s finding that “the [Signature] Patent is claimed suffi-
ciently broadly to foreclose virtually any computer-implemented 
accounting method necessary to manage this type of financial 
structure,”20 he remarked “[w]hether the patent’s claims are too 
broad to be patentable is not to be judged under §101, but rather 
under §§ 102, 103 and 112.”21 But that at least leaves open the pos-
sibility that the requirement of novelty and non-obviousness could 
be found in the method and not its implementation. 
So if patents on obvious business methods are not to be 
awarded, it must be because they are obvious, not because they 
read on methods of doing business. So the next question which 
must be addressed is: how is obviousness to be assessed? 
A.  Non-obviousness 
35 U.S.C. 103 was one of the great advances of the Patent Act 
of 1952.22  By setting forth a definition of the quantum of differ-
ence required to make an innovation patentable, it was intended to 
end the type of hind sight employed in cases like Great A&P Tea 
Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp.23  In that case a device for 
moving customer’s purchases up to the cashier was disallowed, 
 
19. Id. 
20. 149 F.3d at 1377. 
21. Id. at 1375. 
22. 35 U.S.C. §103(a) (1994) states: “A patent may not be obtained though the in-
vention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in § 102 of this title, if the 
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such 
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was 
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.  
Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.” 
Further sections of §103 refer to biotechnology and are not relevant to this paper. 
23. 340 U.S. 147 (1950). 
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even though the Supreme Court agreed with the lower court’s find-
ings that the, “device works as claimed, speeds the customer on his 
[sic] way, reduces checking costs for the merchant, [and] has been 
widely adopted and successfully used.”24  Nonetheless, quoting an 
earlier case, the Court stated that: “[t]he mere aggregation of a 
number of old parts or elements which, in the aggregation, perform 
or produce no new or different function or operation than that 
theretofore performed or produced by them, is not patentable in-
vention.”25  In a concurrence, Justice Douglas went even further, 
stating: 
[the] patent in the present case belongs to this list of in-
credible patents which the Patent Office has spawned. The 
fact that a patent as flimsy and as spurious as this one has 
to be brought all the way to this Court to be declared inva-
lid dramatically illustrates how far our patent system fre-
quently departs from the constitutional standards which are 
supposed to govern.26 
In 1966, Section 103 was fleshed out by the Supreme Court. 
Under section 103, the scope and content of the prior art are 
to be determined; differences between the prior art and the 
claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordi-
nary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this back-
ground, the obviousness or non-obviousness of the subject 
matter is determined. Such secondary considerations such 
as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, and 
failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the 
circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter 
sought to be patented. As indicia of obviousness or non-
obviousness, these inquiries may have relevancy.27   
However, with new technologies, certain of these secondary 
factors are unlikely to be present.  In a field which has just started 
 
24. Id. at 149. 
25. Id. at 151. 
26. Id. at 158. 
27. Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). 
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to develop, for example selling over the Internet, there is unlikely 
to be anything which is truly a “long felt need” simply because of 
the short time scale involved.  Also, it is unlikely that many people 
will have attempted to solve the problem for the same reason: there 
has not been enough time for many people to address it. 
Some cases have recognized a negative version of the secon-
dary considerations.28 Evidence of independent invention, although 
not providing a defense to patent infringement, has been recog-
nized as an indication of the level of knowledge in the field.29  
However, as with positive uses of secondary considerations, in a 
new technology there is unlikely to be enough history for such 
considerations to be useful at the time that a patent is issued. Even 
if such considerations, or their absence, might determine the results 
of an infringement action, they would not have been available to 
avoid the issuance of the bad patent in the first place. 
In the absence of secondary indicia, the primary query relevant 
to obviousness, determining “the scope and content of the prior 
art . . . [the] differences between the prior art and the claims at is-
sue . . . and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. . .”30 
would seem to be the archetypical question for which expert testi-
mony would be both necessary and sufficient. If the task is to de-
termine what the person of ordinary skill in the art was capable of, 
why not find such a person and ask her? The problem, of course, is 
the recurrent one of hindsight. The question is being asked with 
knowledge of the patent application, and invention may be far eas-
ier with that hint.  Despite this admitted problem, it is possible to 
think that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has gone too 
far in the opposite direction and made it too difficult to prove ob-
viousness, especially when dealing with new and unfamiliar tech-
nologies. For example, the predecessor court to the Federal Circuit, 
the Court of Custom and Patent Appeal (“CCPA”) stated in In re 
Pardo: 
 
28. See In re Merck, 800 F.2d 1091, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
29. Id. 
30. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. 
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[T]his court will always construe [the rule permitting judi-
cial notice] narrowly and will regard facts found in such 
manner with an eye toward narrowing the scope of any 
conclusions to be drawn therefrom. Assertions of technical 
facts in areas of esoteric technology must always be sup-
ported by citation to some reference work recognized as 
standard in the pertinent art.31 
But this puts the matter exactly backwards. It is precisely in 
“esoteric technologies” that it is most likely that the practitioners 
will have knowledge of techniques that will be incomprehensible 
to people outside of the field and yet will not have been written 
down in a “reference work recognized as standard” simply because 
there may not be any such work in a new field. 
Since State Street was only decided in 1998, there has not yet 
been extensive litigation regarding patents in the business methods 
area.  However, In re Pardo32 concerns another technology (inven-
tions involving computer programs) whose eligibility for patents 
was only decided comparatively recently, and where complaints 
have also been made about the granting of patents to obvious inno-
vations. I will, therefore, look more closely at the dispute in In re 
Pardo and another Federal Circuit case, In re Zurko,33 in the hope 
that the treatment of obviousness in those cases will yield insights 
that may be useful in the business methods field. 
B.  Obviousness in Program Patents. 
1.  In re Pardo 
Refac Corporation, the assignee of Mr. Pardo’s patent, sued 
Lotus Development Corp., Ashton-Tate Inc., Borland Interna-
 
31. 684 F.2d 912, 917 (CCPA 1982). (The “judicial notice” involved was a deter-
mination by an examiner for the Patent and Trademark Office (hereinafter, “PTO”) that 
the invention in question would have been obvious to a computer programmer in 1970.) 
32. See id. 
33. In re Zurko, 111 F.3d 887 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Zurko I”), rehearing en banc, 142 
F.3d 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Zurko II”);  reversed, sub nom, Dickinson v. Zurko, 119 S. 
Ct. 1816 (1999). 
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tional, Inc., Computer Associates International, Inc., Microsoft 
Corporation, and Informix Software, Inc. for infringement.34 All of 
the defendants manufactured spreadsheet programs. Since none of 
the Refac litigation gives any indication that any of the defendants 
actually used Mr. Pardo’s disclosures to write its code, the reason-
able conclusion is that every spreadsheet producer who faced the 
problem of allowing users to introduce equations in random order 
managed to solve it. In accordance with the teachings of In re 
Merck 35 this would tend to indicate that the state of knowledge in 
the programming field was such that the innovation was obvious 
and would thus suggest that in this matter the PTO was right and 
the CCPA wrong. 
To see what kind of patents get granted under the CCPA rule 
(which has never been repudiated, either by the CCPA or by its 
successor court, the Federal Circuit and is, therefore, binding 
precedent for the Federal Circuit) let us look at In re Pardo more 
closely.  In that case, the court was faced with a rejection of an ap-
plication by the PTO Board of Appeals.36  The application claimed 
a method of solving equations, independent of the order in which 
they were arranged. The Board described the invention as follows: 
Suppose a user provides the following information: 
(1) values for a, b, c and d; 
(2) A = X + Y; 
(3) X = a + b; and 
(4) Y = c + d. 
Obviously, a computer cannot execute these operations in 
the order presented because step (2) cannot be performed 
until the results of steps (3) and (4) are obtained. What the 
appellants’ algorithm does is rearrange the order of the 
 
34. Refac Int’l. Ltd. v. Lotus Dev. Corp., et al., 131 F.R.D. 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
35. In re Merck, 800 F.2d 1091, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (recognizing evidence of in-
dependent invention as an indication of the level of knowledge in he field but not provid-
ing a defense to patent infringement). 
36. 684 F.2d at 914. 
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formulae as presented by the user so that the computer can 
execute the operations. Thus, using our example, the appel-
lants’ algorithmic process would rearrange the formulae as 
follows: 
(1) values for a, b, c and d; 
(2) X = a + b; 
(3) Y = c + d; and 
(4) A = X + Y. 
These formulae, as arranged, can be executed by the com-
puter in a logical, sequential fashion.37 
A representative claim for the application described the method 
employed as: 
(a) examining each of said formulas in a storage area of the 
data processor to determine which formulas can be desig-
nated as defined; 
(b) executing, in the sequence in which each formula is 
designated as defined, said formulas designated as defined; 
(c) repeating steps (a) and (b) for at least undefined formu-
las as many times as required until all said formulas have 
been designated as defined and have been executed; . . . 38 
In other words, all of the equations, and all of the variables on 
which they depend, are stored in memory. The algorithm then 
teaches looking through the list, identifying all variables which are 
given values, either in their defining equations, or from input 
statements. These are identified as being defined. In the next (and 
all successive) repetitions of the procedure, the remaining variables 
are inspected to see whether they are defined in terms of variables 
which have previously been marked “defined.” The algorithm ends 
when either all formulae and variables have been marked “de-
 
37. Id. at 913-14. 
38. Id. at 914. 
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fined,” or there is a pass when no formula or variable can be 
moved from “undefined” to “defined.” 
There are two possible ways in which this invention might be 
non-obvious. Firstly, the method of solving the rearrangement 
problem might be non-obvious.  Secondly, the very notion of al-
lowing the user to present equations in any order and having the 
program do the rearrangement might be the non-obvious part of the 
patent application. Let us consider both possibilities. 
The problem addressed by Mr. Pardo is a specific application 
of a problem in graph theory known as “topological sort.”39  The 
 
39. An ordering is a generalization of the notion of “greater than or equal to” for 
real numbers. Formally, if S is a set of elements, then a relation between elements of S is 
a (partial) ordering if it satisfies the following conditions: 
(i) transitivity: if a<b and b<c then a<c. 
(ii) non-reflexivity: if a<b and b<a then a and b are the same element. 
 If, furthermore, for any two elements of S, a and b, either a<b or b<a, (or, if a and b 
are the same element, both) then the ordering “<“ is called a total ordering.  The topo-
logical sort problem asks whether, given an ordering, <, there exists a total ordering << 
extending <. That is, whenever a < b then a << b. 
 A solution to the topological sort problem consists not only of an answer to the 
above question (the answer is “yes”) but also an effective way of constructing the extend-
ing total order.  It is also desirable that the method (or algorithm) work quickly, both be-
cause topological sort is used in many computer applications (the name comes from its 
use in computer graphics) where speed is desired and because faster methods are usually 
viewed as more elegant by the mathematicians who develop them.  To see the relation 
between topological sort and the reordering problem in Pardo’s application, let S be the 
set of all formulae and variables to be solved. Say a<b, if b is defined in terms of a, that 
is, if a is one of the variables in the definition of b. In the example given by the Board, 
X<A, Y<A,a<X, b<X, c<Y,d<Y. 
 An example of an extending total order is: 
a<b<<X<<c<<d<<Y<<A. 
 The equations can be solved in the order given by going from left to right in the total 
order.  Note that the given total order is not unique.  For example: a,b,c and d could be in 
any order, so long as a and b precede X and c and d precede Y.  Other, similar, changes 
may also be made. 
 The trouble with the Pardo algorithm is that it could transfer as few as one variable 
from “undefined” to “defined” in each pass.  Furthermore, for each variable it examines, 
it must check the status of every variable on which it depends.  If even one of those vari-
ables is undefined, it moves on to the next, discarding all of the information it has on the 
other defining variables.  A much faster method can be devised which traces the depend-
encies of variables in order. Starting with A such an algorithm might then go to X which, 
it would then notice, depends on, say, a, for which there is an assigned value.  That would 
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method given in the patent application is a solution, albeit a very 
poor one, to this problem.  Although a better algorithm for this 
problem was not published until 5 years after Pardo filed his patent 
application, it is likely that his technique was used even before its 
publication because the problem is a common one and because 
depth-first search was a primary application of the computer lan-
guage LISP 1.5 which was introduced some ten years before 
Pardo’s application.40 
But the important point is that the method employed by Pardo 
is indeed the obvious one to try. It consists of saying, “what can I 
do?” at each step and then doing it. However, the CCPA was not 
convinced, as the Board of Appeals had been, of the transparency 
of the method.  Apparently the Board of Appeal failed to cite an 
appropriate reference for the triviality of the programming tech-
nique. It is hard to believe that any reader of Knuth’s Art of Com-
puter Programming,41 the first edition of which was published in 
1968, would have had much difficulty working out Pardo’s 
method, but the failure to adduce such evidence led to the patent 
being granted. 
As for the other possibility, that the realization of the desirabil-
ity of being able to reorder equations was the non-obvious part of 
the application, it must be remembered that every maker of spread-
sheets apparently noticed and solved that very problem.42  The fact 
that reordering had not been a major feature of computer languages 
before the advent of spreadsheets is due to the nature of the users 
of earlier computers.  When computers were used only by pro-
 
mean that a could be marked as the “smallest” element of the total order being con-
structed.  The algorithm would next check b, the other variable on which X depends, find 
it had a value, mark b as “next smallest”, return to X, find that it was now defined solely 
in terms of variables already defined, and mark X “third smallest”, and continue in that 
manner.  This technique is called depth-first search, and its application to topological 
search was first published by Tarjan in 1975. The total order displayed above is the one 
which would result from an application of Tarjan’s method. 
40. LISP is a computer language (LIST Processing Language) invented at MIT in 
the late 1950’s.  It is a high level language (HLL) as opposed to an assembler language. 
(visited October 26, 1999) <http://www.netmeg.net/jargon/terms/l/lisp.html>. 
41. See DONALD ERVIN KNUTH, THE ART OF COMPUTER PROGRAMMING (1968). 
42. See Refac Int’l Ltd. v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 131 F.R.D 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
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grammers and engineers it was easy simply to let the users take 
care of ordering their equations properly. Furthermore in that pe-
riod, pre-1970, computers were expensive and had little memory.  
It simply did not make sense to use the computer to do things that 
the user could easily do. But with the advent of cheap microcom-
puters and spreadsheets, untrained users were putting together 
spreadsheets on which they might do complicated calculations. If a 
user decided that column 10 should represent “local taxes” and did 
not realize until she was designing column 17 that she needed a 
“local real estate tax rate” value it was a real convenience to her if 
the computer would make it all come out right. Furthermore, by 
the time that spreadsheets came out in the late 1970’s, computers 
were cheap enough and big enough so that they could do the nec-
essary work, even employing as inefficient an algorithm as the one 
set forth by Mr. Pardo. 
As a further note, the Board of Appeals had also rejected the 
application because the patent claimed an algorithm and was there-
fore barred by the Supreme Court’s decision in Gottschalk v. Ben-
son.43  On the matter of statutory subject matter, the CCPA had this 
to say: 
It has often been recognized that the word “algorithm” is 
subject to a number of definitions. The Supreme Court has 
defined it as a ‘procedure for solving a given type of 
mathematical problem.’ [footnote and citations omitted] It 
is this type of algorithm that constitutes nonstatutory sub-
ject matter, and this court has consistently rejected attempts 
to enlarge the ‘mathematical algorithm’ exception to the 
definition of patentable subject matter is § 101 to include 
nonmathematical algorithms.44 
But the CCPA was “unable to find any mathematical formula, 
calculation, or algorithm either directly or indirectly recited in the 
claimed steps of examining, compiling, storing, and executing.”45 
 
43. 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
44. Pardo, 684 F.2d at 915. 
45. Id. at 916. 
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Indeed, the examiner acknowledged that “[t]he ‘algorithm’ of the 
present application is not ‘mathematical’ (although it deals with 
the proper sequence for performing mathematics).”46 That is, Ben-
son dealt only with mathematical algorithms and, while Pardo did 
claim an algorithm, it wasn’t a mathematical algorithm, so there 
was no section 101 problem. This limitation of the meaning of 
“mathematical” seems idiosyncratic both as a matter of the field’s 
definition of itself and of the logic of the decision in Gottschalk v. 
Benson.47 
2.  In re Zurko 
The theme of requiring specific references to all of the details 
to find a computer-related patent application to be obvious recurs 
in Zurko I.48  Here the matter is somewhat less clear, because the 
patent application, as quoted by the Federal Circuit uses terms 
which are not as commonly used in the computer literature as are 
those used in Pardo. Nonetheless, the outline of the invention can 
be reconstructed, partly by reference to the corresponding Euro-
pean filing.49 
Claim one of the application read: 
1. A machine-executed method for executing a trusted 
command issued by a user on a computer system, the com-
puter system including an untrusted computing environ-
ment and a trusted computing environment, said method 
comprising the steps of: (a) parsing the trusted command in 
the untrusted computing environment to generate a parsed 
command; (b) submitting the parsed command to the 
trusted computing environment; (c) displaying a representa-
tion of the parsed command to the user through a trusted 
path; (d) receiving a signal from the user through a trusted 
path signifying whether the displayed representation accu-
 
46. Id.  
47. 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
48. 111 F.3d at 889. 
49. See Zurko’s European Patent Application,  <<http://www.patents.ibm.com/cgi-
bin/viewpat.cmd/EP00443423A3>> (last visited Dec. 10, 1999).  
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rately represents the user’s intentions; (e) if the signal sig-
nifies that the displayed representation does not accurately 
represent the user’s intentions, then preventing the execu-
tion of the parsed command; and (f) if the signal signifies 
that the displayed representation accurately represents the 
user’s intentions, executing the parsed command in the 
trusted environment.50 
The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences found, and the 
Federal Circuit agreed that the prior art taught all parts of the 
claimed invention, except (c) and (d) and that the prior art taught 
performing the same check-back, but through an untrusted path. It 
rejected the Board’s argument that since there are only trusted and 
untrusted paths, and since the purpose of the invention was to pro-
vide security, it would be obvious to try using a trusted path for the 
check-back. This, the Federal Circuit stated, was impermissible 
hindsight. 
The phrase “trusted path” can have either a hardware or a soft-
ware meaning.51  In the former case it refers to shielded and pro-
tected cables. In a computer security context, it usually refers to 
some form of encrypted data transmission.  An example of such 
encrypted communications is provided by MIT’s computing envi-
ronment, Kerberos, which is supplied with many UNIX systems.52  
Again, what seems to have happened is that the instincts of the 
PTO examiners were correct but they failed to provide sufficiently 
detailed documentation of prior art. This, given the Federal Cir-
cuit’s reluctance to take anything as obvious unless it can be found 
in a “reference work recognized as standard,”53 was fatal to the 
rejection. 
Of course the PTO has to work within the interpretation of the 
law given by the Federal Circuit. And, indeed, the rules for the ex-
amination of patent applications closely track the case law. For ex-
 
50. Zurko I at 888. 
51. Id. 
52. Menezes, et al, HANDBOOK OF APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY, 501-502 (1997). 
53.  Pardo, 684 F.2d at 917. 
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ample, the Manual for Patent Examination Procedure states: 
Obviousness can only be established by combining or 
modifying the teachings of the prior art to produce the 
claimed invention where there is some teaching, sugges-
tion, or motivation to do so found either in the references 
themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one 
of ordinary skill in the art.54 
Thus, in Zurko, it is not enough that the prior art teaches, in 
particular, the usefulness of check-backs and the existence of 
trusted paths, it must explicitly suggest combining them. 
This strict standard may well be the reason that the PTO is cur-
rently issuing patents in the business methods fields which appear 
to many observers to be quite obvious. For example they may not 
have found the Priceline.com patent quoted at the beginning of this 
paper55 to be obvious because, following the directives of the Fed-
eral Circuit, they were unable to find anything in the literature sug-
gesting that it might be a good idea to computerize such transac-
tions. 
Ultimately, whether one feels that patents are being granted 
which should be rejected for obviousness or whether one feels that 
the current practice is the only effective prophylaxis against a de-
scent into unbridled hindsight seems to be a matter of personal 
opinion and professional situation. However, especially if one 
agrees that the examples I have cited show that patents are being 
granted which should not be, the question of what can and should 
be done about them remains to be discussed.  Which brings us to 
the Supreme Court’s review of in re Zurko.56 
3.  Dickinson v. Zurko 
As discussed above, in Zurko I the Federal Circuit reversed a 
decision of the Board or Patent Appeals and Interferences rejecting 
 
54. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINATION PROCEDURE § 2143.01 (citations omitted). 
55. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
56. 409 U.S. 63. 
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Ms. Zurko’s application on the grounds of obviousness. As the 
Federal Circuit explains, in Zurko II: 
Concluding that the outcome of this appeal turns on the 
standard of review used by this court to review board fact 
finding, we accepted the Commissioner’s suggestion that 
we rehear the appeal in banc so that we could consider the 
following question: “Should this court review Patent and 
Trademark Office fact-findings under the Administrative 
Procedure Act standard of review instead of the presently 
[sic] applied ‘clearly erroneous’ standard?57 
Chief Judge Mayer explained the issue as: 
Specifically, the Commissioner argues that in appeals under 
35 U.S.C. § 141, we should accept the factual findings un-
derlying the board’s patentability determinations as long as 
they are supported by probative evidence of a substantial 
nature (the substantial evidence standard found at 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706(2)(E)), or in the alternative as long as they were 
made upon consideration of the proper factors (the arbitrary 
and capricious standard found at 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). 
Both standards require that we review board decisions on 
their own reasoning. Currently, we affirm decisions as long 
as we lack a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been made.58 
His decision was that: “[S]ection 559 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act permits, and stare decisis warrants, [the Court’s] 
continued application of the clearly erroneous standard in our re-
view of these fact-findings.”59 
However the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.60 
Writing for the majority in a 7-2 decision, Justice Breyer con-
cluded that neither the history of the standard of review applied by 
 
57. Zurko II, 142 F.3d at 1449. 
58. Id. (citations omitted). 
59. Id. 
60. 119 S. Ct 1816. 
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the CCPA and the Federal Circuit, nor policy considerations justi-
fied the application of a stricter standard than that set forth by the 
Administrative Procedure Act.61  While finding for the Commis-
sioner of the PTO, Justice Breyer remarked: 
The court/agency standard, as we have said, is somewhat 
less strict that the court/court standard. But the difference is 
a subtle one—so fine that (apart from the present case) we 
have failed to uncover a single instance in which a review-
ing court conceded that use of one standard rather than the 
other would in fact have produced a different outcome.62 
The problem with this analysis, of course, is that the standard 
which the Federal Circuit has applied under the name of “clearly 
erroneous” is not that at all; it is a total de novo review under 
which the court second guesses the PTO whenever it disagrees 
with its conclusions. 
Clearly, this was a classic turf battle. The Commissioner wants 
greater deference to the decisions of his examiners, and the Federal 
Circuit wanted to keep the control it had. To the extent that one is 
convinced by the above argument that patents are being granted to 
obvious innovation, I suggest that the Supreme Court’s decision 
will decrease the flow of bad patents. 
An interesting question is why the Federal Circuit was so will-
ing to grant patents, which the PTO found to be obvious.  The pub-
lic choice scholars have suggested that administrative agencies are 
subject to capture by the industries they are supposed to regulate.63  
Among the mechanisms they have cited is the movement of people 
from employment by an agency to employment by firms which 
they had previously regulated. The danger is that they may try to 
gain favor with a potential employer by making decisions favor-
 
61. Id. at 
62. Id. at 1823. 
63. See Gary Minda, Interest Groups, Political Freedom and Antitrust: A Moder 
Assessment of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 905 (1990); Jonathan 
Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An 
Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471, 513 (1988) (discussing capture 
of agencies by those they are intended to regulate). 
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able to that employer. 
Such a scenario certainly could play out among the examiners 
in the PTO. At least some examiners stay for only a few years and 
then go off to work for patent law firms or for companies, which 
handle patent applications internally.64  It would clearly be possible 
for such an agent either explicitly or implicitly to try to trade her 
actions for future employment. 
The possibility of such opportunistic behavior is clearly less at 
the Federal Circuit. The only short-term personnel there are the 
clerks and there are far fewer Federal Circuit clerks than PTO ex-
aminers and, more importantly, the clerk’s affect on any given de-
cision is institutionally shielded and difficult to verify. So at least 
the cruder of the explanations of “agency capture” would suggest 
the type of situation which Mr. Justice Douglas thought he ob-
served: a PTO granting unwarranted patents.65  But it fails utterly 
to explain the recent experience of the Federal Circuit pushing 
software patents on an unwilling PTO. 
A possible answer to this conundrum might be the concerns 
expressed by successive Commissioners about the difficulties 
which software patents would present to the search capabilities of 
the PTO. As early as 1972, in Gottschalk v. Benson, the Court 
quoted the Report of the President’s Commission on the Patent 
System.66 
The Patent Office now cannot examine applications for pro-
grams because of a lack of a classification technique and the 
requisite search files. Even if these were available, reliable 
searches would not be feasible or economic because of the 
tremendous volume of prior art being generated. Without this 
search, the patenting of programs would be tantamount to 
mere registration and the presumption of validity would be all 
 
64. See Robert A. Armitage, Corporate Counsel’s Role in Patent Litigation: Man-
aging a Legal Team to Meet Busines’s Objectives, 375 PLI/Pat. 135, n.2 (1993). 
65. See Great A & P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147 
(1950). 
66.  Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972). 
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but nonexistent.67 
Similar objections were raised by the Commissioner in both 
Parker v. Flook68 and Diamond v. Diehr.69 Perhaps the organiza-
tional concerns of the head of the PTO outweighed the opportun-
ism at a lower level. This does not explain the pro-software patent 
enthusiasm of the Federal Circuit, but perhaps that can be attrib-
uted to an unconstrained desire to expand its range of influence. 
Surely, a more deferential standard of review will make it eas-
ier for examiners to reject applications as obvious. Zurko70 was 
precisely about that issue. However, granting greater power to the 
PTO might not even be a solution to that limited problem? What 
assurance is there that, at some later time, the PTO might not de-
velop a sort of “A&P” mindset71 and start applying that type of 
hindsight to reject too many applications? 
While it is, of course, possible to invent a scenario where such 
a thing occurs, the organizational structure of the PTO would seem 
to make such a course extremely unlikely. The PTO is currently 
funded entirely through user fees.72  Although there are indeed ap-
plication fees, there are also issuance fees and maintenance fees. 
The effect of these is that the PTO has a positive incentive to grant 
patents. It is, in fact, a tribute to the integrity of the PTO that it re-
jects as many applications as it does. 
In addition, one of the arguments for the existence of adminis-
trative agencies is that they can assemble expertise which would be 
beyond the ability of either the Judiciary or the Legislature to ob-
 
67. Id. 
68. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
69. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
70. 119 S. Ct. 1816. 
71. See supra text accompanying notes 23-26. 
72. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Our Business: An Introduction to the PTO, 
(visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/intro.html>.  “Since 1991— 
under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1990— the PTO has operated 
in much the same way as a private business, providing valued products and services to 
our customers in exchange for fees which are used to fully fund our operations. The pri-
mary services we provide include processing patents and trademarks and disseminating 
patent and trademark information.”Id. 
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tain.73  The argument is that an agency always faces the same type 
of problems, and can staff itself accordingly. The Judiciary and the 
Legislature, on the other hand, have to be generalists. Even in the 
case of a specialized court, such as the Federal Circuit, there is 
only a limited research staff and technical expertise is largely pro-
vided by clerks whose tenure is, in many case, limited. The PTO, 
on the other hand, has about 2500 examiners,74 many of whom 
have spent decades with the office. It is at least possible for the 
PTO to develop the type of expertise which would enable its exam-
iners correctly to judge the skill of the practitioner in a given art. 
4.  Technical Qualification at the PTO 
But it is not enough to say that the PTO could have examiners 
who could properly handle obviousness. We must also ask whether 
the PTO’s procedures provide any assurance that it would assem-
ble such staff, especially in new fields, where as I have suggested, 
the problems of obviousness are likely to be greatest. A look at the 
PTO procedure for the hiring of examiners suggests that it has a 
degree of difficulty in its accommodation to new fields. 
 
73. See Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
74. “The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) determines the patentability of dis-
coveries of inventors throughout the world. This determination is made by approximately 
2500 highly trained scientists and engineers (Patent Examiners). An Examiner analyzes 
the subject matter of a patent application and the pertinent prior art, i.e. patents and other 
published technical materials, and determines whether the claimed invention is pat-
entable. He/she applies procedural and substantive law and grants or rejects the claims of 
the  
application.” USPTO Organizational Profile 
<http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ahrpa/ohr/jobs/exam.htm.>>  
 According to small number of former examiners with whom I have spoken, some art 
units give new examiners patent files to study as an introduction to the field in which they 
will be examining.  In other units patent files are not used, but the new recruit is given 
standard texts in the field, and her progress is monitored by more senior examiners. In 
either case institutional memory is being preserved. It is precisely this function which, I 
believe, makes patent examination work in established fields and which, I fear, will not 
be successfully done in new technologies. 
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a.  PTO Criteria for Examiners. 
The PTO maintains an on-line form on which one may apply 
for the position of patent examiner.75  Section 4 of that form re-
quires information on the applicant’s educational background.76  A 
subsection of that section requires the applicant to “click on the 
appropriate button regarding your formal education.” The relevant 
clickable boxes are: “Bachelor Arts/Sciences (Electrical engineer-
ing or Computer engineering, Computer Science, Physics, Biology, 
Biotech, Chemistry, or Chemical engineering)”, “Master of 
Arts/Sciences (Electrical engineering or Computer engineering, 
Computer Science, Physics, Biology, Biotech, Chemistry, or 
Chemical engineering)” and “Ph.D” (with no field limitation given 
for holders of the Ph.D. degree.) The point being that in order even 
to apply for a position as an examiner, a person must have a degree 
in a traditional technical field. In particular, a person with a BA in 
Economics who had later received an MBA from a business 
school, arguably the ideal background for an examiner who would 
review patent application for business methods, would be elimi-
nated from consideration for such a position at the earliest part of 
the application process. 
This reluctance to hire examiners with a background outside of 
engineering and the traditional lab sciences is a historical feature of 
the PTO. As early as the 1966 report of the President’s Commis-
sion on the Patent System, it was realized that “[t]he Patent Office 
now cannot examine applications for programs because of a lack of 
a classification technique and the requisite search files.”77  In other 
words, it was felt that “search files”, i.e. previously issued patents, 
were of necessity the basis for any future searching.  The fact that 
 
75. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Employment Application (visited Oct. 26, 
1999) <http://www.uspto.gov/go/jars/index.html>. 
76. Id. 
77. SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS, COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 90TH CONG., REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N. ON THE PATENT SYSTEM 5, 
at 13 (U.S. Gov. Printing Office 1967). “To Promote the Progress of . . . Useful Arts,” 
Report of the President’s Commission on the Patent System (1966), quoted in Gottschalk 
v. Benson 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972). 
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computer programming had by 1966 produced a formidable litera-
ture was not recognized nor was the possibility of basing searches 
on that literature.78 
For 14 years after the report of the President’s Commission, the 
PTO continued successfully to oppose all inventions involving 
computer programs. However in 1981 the Supreme Court decided 
Diamond v. Diehr79 and, thereafter, the PTO was obliged to exam-
ine patents involving computer programs and could not merely re-
ject them as reading on non-statutory subject matter.  Nonetheless, 
according to the Wall Street Journal, the PTO did not hire its first 
examiner with a degree in computer science, as opposed to the en-
gineering and laboratory science degrees it previously required, 
until 1995.80 
This requirement for a degree in the traditional “hard’ sciences 
is also imposed on applicants who wish to become patent agents to 
engage in patent prosecution practice before the PTO.  Here too, 
the PTO web site provides useful information about the require-
ments for taking the patent agent examination.81  In its discussion 
of the necessity of a technical education for applicants, the PTO 
gives a series of methods for satisfying its requirements.  These are 
similar to, although more detailed than, the requirements for exam-
iners. However, in the requirements for applicants for the agent ex-
amination, the PTO gives a helpful negative list. 
[t]he following typify courses which are not accepted as 
demonstrating the necessary scientific and technical train-
ing: science courses for non-science majors; . . . mathemat-
ics courses; high school level courses; one day conferences, 
patent law courses, continuing legal education courses; . . .; 
courses in management, business administration and opera-
tions research; courses directed to data management and 
 
78. Id. 
79. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
80. Scott Thurm, A Flood of Web Patents Stirs Debate Over Tactics, WALL ST. J.., 
Oct. 9, 1998, at B1. 
81. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, General Requirements Bulletin (last modi-
fied Nov. 3, 1999)< http://ww.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/oed/grb9911.htm>. 
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management information systems; . . .; computer courses 
which are directed to business applications; . . .82 
In other words, the PTO’s regulations make it likely that appli-
cations involving business systems will not be assisted by agents 
with the type of business training which would enable them under-
stand, evaluate and present such applications. And to the extent 
that the PTO continues to have similar requirements for its exam-
iners, these imperfectly prepared applications will be examined by 
people equally poorly trained. 
It is of course true that there are many people with a technical 
degree which would get them past the PTO’s employment re-
quirement who then went on to business school. It is also true that 
some of those people may apply for jobs as patent examiners. 
However, depending on such people for business expertise, as the 
PTO now does,83 substantially limits the pool of applicants. 
Nonetheless, there seems to be nothing in either the patent stat-
utes or regulations which would prevent the hiring of, for example, 
economics majors as examiners. If the PTO were to win the defer-
ence which it is seeking in Zurko,84 it would behoove it to change 
its staffing procedures so as to be able to use its power wisely. In 
fact, even if the PTO loses Zurko, it should re-think its attachment 
to engineering and the lab sciences. 
II.  THE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY FOR ISSUED PATENTS. 
Finally, assuming that either the PTO is unwilling or, more 
likely, unable to find examining staff capable of working in new 
technological fields, it might still be possible to ameliorate the 
problems of improvidently granted patents if the strong presump-
tion of validity contained in 35 U.S.C. § 28285 could be waived. 
 
82. Id. 
83. Conversation at the PTO with Gerald Goldberg, Director, Technology Center 
2700 (which covers most computer program patents) December 18, 1998. 
84. See discussion supra part I.3. 
85. “A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a patent (whether in independ-
ent, dependent, or multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid independently of the 
validity of other claims; dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be presumed valid 
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Section 282 asserts that an issued patent is presumed valid. 
However, the judicial interpretation of this section is that the valid-
ity of each and every challenged claim of a patent must be dis-
proved by “clear and convincing evidence,”86 a heavier burden 
than the preponderance of the evidence normally required in litiga-
tion. The reason that patents are given such a strong presumption 
of validity is precisely because of the faith the courts have in the 
examination process. If, then, the PTO knows that in a particular 
field its examination is not up to the standard it normally main-
tains, it follows that the result of examinations in that field should 
not receive such a strong presumption of validity. 
It is clear that the PTO could not adopt such a plan on its own. 
In a somewhat analogous situation, the PTO attempted to adopt a 
“rule of doubt” in patent re-examination proceedings where in de-
ciding whether to hold a hearing, it would resolve all issues of va-
lidity in favor of the party seeking re-examination and, hence, 
against the patent holder.87  The Federal Circuit noted that there 
was no statutory authority for such a rule of doubt. It also reviewed 
the legislative history of the sections concerning re-examination 
and determined that the procedure was designed to safeguard the 
interests of the patent holder. Accordingly it found that the PTO 
had exceeded its authority in attempting to use its rule of doubt.88 
Since section 282 is undoubtedly intended for the benefit of the 
patent holder, similar reasoning would probably invalidate any at-
tempt on the part of the PTO to implement a waiver of § 282 on its 
own. Congress, however, could certainly give the PTO such 
power. One restriction on such a power might, however be pru-
dent. While agencies may well be reluctant to admit their incapaci-
ties in any area, it is also possible that the reduction of pressure on 
the PTO caused by admitting its deficiencies in examining a given 
 
even though dependent upon an invalid claim . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1998). 
86. Monarch Knitting Mach. v. Sulzer Morat Gmbh, 139 F.3d 877, 881 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). Huges Tool v. Dresser Indus., 816 F.2d 1549,1555 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 
484 U.S. 914 (1987). 
87. See  Patlex Corporation v. Mossinghoff, 771 F.2d 480, 483 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
88. See id. 
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area might cause it not to work as hard as it could to upgrade the 
examiners in that area. For that reason a time limit of a few years 
might be placed on any such waiver. 
CONCLUSION 
Finally, assume either that the Supreme Court upholds the de-
cision in Zurko and the Federal Circuit continues to impose strong 
requirements for finding obviousness or that the PTO is unable or 
unwilling to hire examiners who have sufficient background in 
business to discern obvious methods when they see them. In either 
case, patents will be granted on techniques that would otherwise be 
in the public domain. How bad will that be? 
Clearly the answer will vary from patent to patent. The entire 
purpose of the patent grant is to enable the patent holder to raise 
the price of his invention. However the amount that he can charge 
depends on how much better his innovation is than the next best 
way of doing the job. In many cases the patented business may not 
be much better than its nearest unpatented substitute and in such a 
case the tax imposed by the patent will be slight. 
Richard Nelson has analysed the effect of patents in different 
fields, and finds great differences in their value in different areas.89 
In particular, patents are found to be crucial in the pharmaceutical 
area, very important in many chemical fields and less important in 
the mechanical and electrical arts.90  There are also indications that 
patents have, despite some well known suits, not played a very 
great role in the software industry.91  To the extent that business 
methods are more like the latter set of arts than the first two, the 
primary effect of the granting of patents on obvious business 
methods may not be to levy a debilitating tax on businesses but 
rather to outrage patent practitioners and even more to outrage in-
tellectual property academics who will not benefit as much from 
the legal fees such patents will generate. 
 
89. See NELSON, THE SOURCE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (1996). 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
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